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REGULATING THE MOTHER'S MILK OF POLITICS: WHY
WASHINGTON'S
CAMPAIGN
FINANCE
LAW
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITS STATE PARTIES FROM
SPENDING SOFT MONEY ON ISSUE ADS
Scott Holleman
Abstract: The possibility that elected officials may exchange their votes on pending
legislation for donations to help their re-election campaigns poses a serious threat to
democratic government. To alleviate this risk, governments at the state and national levels
regulate how politicians finance their campaigns. However, these regulatory efforts have
been challenged on First Amendment grounds. In Buckley v. Valeo, the United States
Supreme Court upheld certain campaign contribution limits, while declaring certain
expenditure limits unconstitutional. The Washington State Supreme Court relied on the
Buckley opinion in Washington State Republican Party v. Washington Public Disclosure
Commission, when it ruled that the First Amendment barred the state from limiting certain
expenditures by political parties on issue advertisements. However, in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, which clarified and expanded upon the Buckley decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently upheld some restrictions on issue ad expenditures. This Comment
argues that, in light of the McConnell decision, the state court's decision misinterpreted
Buckley. The Washington State Supreme Court improperly concluded that Washington
State's prohibition on the expenditure of soft money for issue advertisements by the state's
political parties was unconstitutional. Accordingly, this Comment calls for the state's Public
Disclosure Commission to adopt rules barring such expenditures.

Campaign finance regulations present unique legal difficulties.'
Limitations on raising or spending money to express political ideas
interfere with the speech and associational rights that lie at the heart of
the First Amendment.2 At the same time, a total absence of regulation of
campaign finances could permit large campaign contributions to
compromise the integrity of democratic institutions.3 Money is essential
for effective political communication, yet it can lead to serious abuses of
power.4 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has attempted
1. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003) (asserting interdependence
of electoral process and First Amendment freedoms justifies a lower standard of scrutiny for certain
campaign finance regulations).
2. U.S. CONST. amend I. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 264 (1986). "Freedom of speech plays a fundamental role in a democracy; as this Court has
said, freedom of thought and speech 'is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
other form of freedom."' Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)).
3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (discussing the corruption that can result from
large financial contributions).
4. Because of these dual aspects of money, it is often called the "mother's milk of politics," a
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to strike a delicate balance between these concerns in its campaign
finance jurisprudence.'
Federal and state governments have had mixed success defending
campaign finance regulations against constitutional challenges. For
example, in Buckley v. Valeo,6 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld statutory
limitations on what people could contribute to political campaigns.'
However, the Buckley Court struck down limitations on how much
people could spend directly on election-related speech. 8 To avoid
unconstitutional vagueness, the Court narrowly construed regulations on
"independent expenditures" 9 so that they applied only to money spent
"expressly advocating" a candidate's election or defeat.10 This created a
loophole for "issue ads," which do not explicitly call for a particular
electoral outcome." Relying on the Buckley decision, the Washington
State Supreme Court held that a statute restricting the use of soft
money 12 by the state's political parties to fund issue ads violated the
First Amendment.' 3 However, in the recent case of McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, 14 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld some
limitations on issue ad spending; this undermines the rationale behind
the Washington State Supreme Court decision."
phrase generally attributed to Jesse Unruh, Speaker of the California Assembly from 1961 to 1968.
People v. Hedgecock, 247 Cal. Rptr. 404, 410 n.1 (1988).
5. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137 (discussing need to weigh competing constitutional interests
when dealing with campaign finance regulation).
6. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. See id. at 58.
8. See id.
9. The phrase "independent expenditure" refers to election-oriented spending that is not
coordinated with a candidate's campaign. See id. at 46-47.
10. See id. at 41-43 (addressing independent expenditure limit); id. at 78-80 (addressing
independent expenditure disclosure requirements).
11. The phrase "issue ad" refers to advertisements that do not use words of "express advocacy,"
such as "Vote for Jones" or "Defeat Senator Smith." See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540
U.S. 93, 126 (2003). These ads commonly appear on television shortly before an election and
discuss a candidate's positions on issues. The use of such ads is called issue advocacy. See infra
Part I.D.2.
12. "Soft money" refers to contributions to political parties that are not subject to any amount
limitation. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-26. In this context, the phrase refers to contributions to
state political parties that are exempted from the normal limitations of RCW 42.17.640(6) (2004);
this money is also referred to as "exempt." See infra Part II.A.
13. Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 141 Wash. 2d 245,
274, 4 P.3d 808, 824 (2000).
14. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
15. Id.at 194.
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This Comment argues that, in light of the McConnell decision,
Washington State may prohibit the state's political parties from spending
soft money on issue ads without violating the U.S. Constitution.1 6 The
Washington State Supreme Court misread Buckley to stand for the
proposition that the First Amendment prevents the government from
regulating the use of issue ads in political campaigns. 17 The McConnell
Court clarified that the First Amendment allows such regulation of issue
ads, and the Constitution's Due Process requirements are met if the
regulation is not unconstitutionally vague. 18 Therefore, the Washington
State Supreme Court erred in its analysis by failing to address the
statute's vagueness and failing to apply the appropriate test from the
Buckley decision. 19 A proper analysis, informed by the McConnell
decision, should begin with a court classifying Washington State's soft
money restriction as a contribution limitation. 20 The court should then
analyze the provision's First Amendment implications under the Buckley
Court's "closely drawn" test.2 1 Finally, the court'should conclude that

the provision is not unconstitutionally vague and that it satisfies the
closely drawn test because it furthers the same "sufficiently important"
government interest and is more 22"closely drawn" than analogous federal
provisions upheld in McConnell.
Part I of this Comment discusses the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA) 23 and the Buckley Court's assessment of its constitutionality.
Part II describes Washington's Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) and
Washington State Republican Party v. Washington State Public
Disclosure Commission.24 Part III explains the changes that the
16. See id. at 156 (upholding analogous soft money ban at federal level).
17. See Wash. State RepublicanParty, 141 Wash. 2d at 263, 4 P.3d at 819.
18. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203-09 (upholding ban on issue ads by corporations and labor
unions against First Amendment challenge); id. at 194 (concluding that ban was not
unconstitutionally vague).
19. See Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wash. 2d at 263-64, 4 P.3d at 819 (basing holding on
idea that "issue advocacy is beyond the reach of government regulation").
20. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 138-39 (concluding analogous federal regulations were
contribution limits).
21. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
22. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161 (upholding national party ban); id. at 173 (upholding state
party ban).
23. This Comment uses the acronym FECA to refer to the Federal Election Campaign Act as
amended in 1974. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Star. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000)).
24. 41 Wash. 2d 245, 4 P.3d 808 (2000); The Fair Campaign Practices Act was passed by an
initiative in 1992 and is codified in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.04 and 42.17
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Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) made to FECA and why the
McConnell Court upheld them. Part IV argues that, in view of the
McConnell decision, Washington law constitutionally prohibits the
state's political parties from using their soft money to purchase issue
ads. Part V concludes that the Washington State Public Disclosure
Commission should adopt rules to clarify that such expenditures are
illegal.
THE BUCKLEY COURT ESTABLISHED PARAMETERS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION

I.

In Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court established the basic
approach used to analyze the constitutionality of campaign finance
laws. 25 First, the Court classified FECA's monetary restrictions as either
contribution limits or expenditure limits. 26 Next, the Court scrutinized
the restrictions for unconstitutional vagueness. 27 Finally, using "closely
drawn" scrutiny for the contribution limits and "exacting" scrutiny for
the expenditure limits, the Court assessed whether the restrictions
violated the First Amendment.28 The Court concluded that FECA
constitutionally limited campaign contributions, 29 but that FECA
unconstitutionally limited independent expenditures and overall
campaign expenditures in violation of the First Amendment.3" In the
wake of the Buckley decision, two loopholes developed, which further
undermined FECA's effectiveness.3 1
FECA Limited Contributionsand Expenditures

A.

The Buckley Court began its analysis of FECA by dividing the law's

(2004).
25. See Note, Satisfying the "Appearance of Justice": The Uses of Apparent Impropriety in

Constitutional Adjudication, 117 HARv. L. REv. 2708, 2711 (2004) (noting that the Buckley
decision "established the modem framework for determining the constitutionality of campaign
finance restrictions...").
26. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7. In addition to monetary restrictions, FECA also restricted the types of
donations that could escape public disclosure, id. at 62-64, but these provisions are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
27. See id. at 40-44.
28. See id. at 25 (applying closely drawn scrutiny); id. at 44-45 (applying exacting scrutiny).
29. See id. at 58.
30. Id. at 44-45, 58.
31. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 122-29 (2003).
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restrictions into contribution limits and expenditure limits. 32 The law's
contribution limits capped the amount people 33 could give to campaigns,
political committees, and political parties.3 4 In contrast, the law's
expenditure limits capped the amount campaigns could spend, 35 as well
as the amount people acting independently of campaigns could spend
"relative to" a candidate.3 6 FECA did not, however, draw a rigid line
between these two forms of restriction. 37 For example, the law defined
an expenditure made in coordination with a campaign as a contribution,
38
and the Court accepted this functional definition of a contribution.
B.

The Buckley Court Narrowly ConstruedFECA's Independent
Expenditure Limit

In Buckley, the Court analyzed FECA's contribution and expenditure
limitations to determine if they were unconstitutionally vague.39 Vague
laws violate a person's right to due process by failing to give fair
warning of prohibited conduct. 40 In order to avoid "trapping the
32. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12-13.
33. FECA defines "person" to include "an individual, partnership, committee, association,
corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of persons." 2 U.S.C. § 431(11)
(2000 & Supp. II 2002).
34. As enacted, FECA limited personal contributions to federal candidates ($1,000 per election),
political committees ($5,000 per year), and the national parties ($20,000 per year), with a total
aggregate cap of $25,000 per year. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,
which changed some of these dollar limits. They are now $2,000, $5,000, $25,000, and $37,500,
respectively. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (3) (Supp. 112002).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1976), repealed by Act of May 11, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, Title II,
§ 201(a), 90 Stat. 475, 496 (responding to the Buckley decision). The overall ceilings for campaign
expenditures ranged from $30 million for a presidential campaign to $140,000 for campaigns for the
House of Representatives. Id. FECA also limited the expenditure of a candidate's personal funds on
his or her own campaign. Id.
36. This "independent expenditure" provision barred all persons from spending more than $1,000
relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year. Id. § 608(e)(1). It established a few
narrow exceptions, such as spending by corporations to communicate with their stockholders. Id.
37. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
38. See id. at 46 n.53; see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 447 (2001) [hereinafter Colorado I1](characterizing coordinated party
spending as "functional equivalent" of contribution).
39. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24 (analyzing contribution limit); id. at 41 (analyzing expenditure
limit).
40. See id. at 76-77; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("It is a
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined.").
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innocent," courts require that statutory language be clear and precise.4 '
This is especially important when a law implicates First Amendment
rights42 -- a murky and indefinite line between permitted and proscribed
conduct tends to chill speech by causing people to "steer far wider of the
unlawful zone" than they would if the line was clearly demarcated.43 In
such a situation, courts attempt to construe the statute in a way that
avoids vagueness. 44
45
After concluding that FECA's contribution limits were not vague,
the Buckley Court narrowly construed the law's limit on independent
expenditures "relative to" a candidate in order to avoid unconstitutional
vagueness.46 The Court found that the phrase "relative to," standing
alone, was not sufficiently definite to give adequate warning as to what
exactly the limitation prohibited.47 The Court surmised that Congress
intended the phrase to mean "'advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate. 48 However, the Court found that this construction was still
too vague because the First Amendment protects discussion of general
issues, and discussion of candidates could be easily confused with
discussion of general issues. 49 To eliminate the possibility of vagueness,
the Court introduced an "express advocacy" requirement into the
statute 50 by construing the language "relative to" to mean
communication using express words of advocacy, such as "Vote for
Senator Smith" or "Defeat Governor Jones." 5'

41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41.
42. See id. at 41 n.48. "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." Id. (citing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
43. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
44. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77-78.
45. Id. at 24 n.24 (noting definition of contribution did not present serious problems "because of
the limiting connotation created by the general understanding of what constitutes a political
contribution").
46. See id. at 41.
47. Id. (expressing concern that "[t]he use of so indefinite a phrase as 'relative to' a candidate
fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech..
48. Id. at 42.
49. See id. at 43 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945)).
50. See id. at 41-44.
51. See id. at 43-44.
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The Buckley Court Upheld FECA's ContributionLimits, but Struck
Down Its ExpenditureLimits

The Buckley Court emphasized that both FECA's contribution limits
and its expenditure limits raised serious First Amendment questions.5 2
However, the Court also drew a fundamental distinction between the two
54
types of restrictions 53 and subjected them to different levels of scrutiny.
The Court found that the provisions that placed an overall cap on
expenditures by campaigns or independent persons were far more
55
onerous to First Amendment freedoms than the contribution limits.
Therefore, the Court subjected the expenditure limitations to a greater
level of judicial scrutiny.56
1.

The Court Upheld FECA's ContributionLimits Because They Were
Closely Drawn to Advance a Sufficiently ImportantInterest

The Court determined that contribution limits are constitutionally
permissible as long as they are closely drawn and advance a "sufficiently
important" government interest. 57 The Court gave several reasons for
applying the relatively deferential standard of closely drawn scrutiny to
contribution limits, rather than the "strict" or "exacting" scrutiny
applicable to other restrictions on First Amendment rights.5 8 First, the
Court noted that contributions are speech only in the limited sense that
they express the contributor's support for the candidate and the
candidate's views. 59 Therefore, limits on the size of a contribution do not

52. See id. at 14.
53. See id. at 23; see also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (noting "fundamental constitutional difference between money spent to
advertise one's views independently of the candidate's campaign and money contributed to the
candidate to be spent on his [or her] campaign").
54. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (addressing contribution limits); id. at 44 (addressing expenditure
limits).
55. Id. at 23.
56. See id. at 19-21 (describing contribution limits as imposing "only a marginal restriction upon
the contributor's ability to engage in free communication" and expenditure limits as "substantial
rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech").
57. See id. at 29 ("[T]he weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions
to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms
caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.").
58. Seeid. at 20-21.
59. See id. at 21.
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significantly undermine free speech rights.6 ° Second, the Court
acknowledged that contribution limits burden the contributor's freedom
of association because making a contribution affiliates a person with a
candidate. 6' However, the associational burden is relatively minor if the
contribution limit permits contributors to associate with other likeminded individuals by volunteering their time to campaigns and political
associations.62
The Buckley Court upheld FECA's contribution limits using closely
drawn scrutiny.63 The Court reasoned that the government's interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption was sufficiently
important to justify the First Amendment burdens the law imposed.64
The Court also found that the limit was closely drawn because it focused
on the large donations that were most likely to lead to corruption and left
individuals free to associate with and volunteer for campaigns as they
wished.65 However, the Court stated that contribution limits would
violate First Amendment rights if a law's restrictions went so far as to
prevent robust discussion of political issues.66
2.

The Court Held that FECA Failedto Satisfy the Exacting Scrutiny
Test and Thus UnconstitutionallyLimited Expenditures

In contrast to contribution limits, the Court subjected expenditure
limits to an "exacting scrutiny" standard because they place a greater
burden on First Amendment rights. 67 First the Court determined that
expenditure limits cap the quantity of expression in the political
marketplace by restricting the overall amount of money that campaigns
and independent persons can spend. 68 For example, FECA's independent
expenditure limit would have prevented an individual or association
60. See id. ("At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of
the contributor's support for the candidate.").
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id. (observing burden that contribution limits impose on free association is less than burden
that expenditure limits impose).
63. See id. at 25.
64. Id. at 26.
65. See id. at 28.
66. See id. at 21 (observing contribution limits would seriously burden free speech only if they
were so low that they prevent "candidates... from amassing the resources necessary for effective
advocacy").
67. See id. at 44-45.
68. See id. at 19.
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from buying more than $1,000 worth of advertisements to support a
federal candidate. 69 Similarly, FECA's campaign expenditure limit
would have limited the number of advertisements a campaign could
purchase. 70 The Court held that such expenditure limits impose
"markedly" greater burdens on protected First Amendment freedoms
than contribution limits impose. 71 Consequently, the Court subjected
expenditure limits to a higher degree of scrutiny when determining their
constitutionality.72
The Court concluded that FECA's expenditure limits could not
survive exacting scrutiny.73 It reasoned that the government's interest in
curbing corruption inadequately justified the heavy burden imposed by
FECA's independent expenditure limit, 74 even after the Court interpreted
the limit to apply only to express advocacy. 75 The Court also expressed
doubt that independent ads would have a corrupting influence because76
they would be less useful to a campaign than coordinated spending.
Moreover, because the ceiling on independent expenditures applied only
to express advocacy, the Court determined that this limit was not
effectively tailored to advance its anti-corruption objective.77 Finally, the
Court struck down FECA's limitation on total campaign expenditures
because FECA's goal of reducing "wasteful" campaign spending did not
justify its burden on free speech.78

69. See id. at 39-40.
70. See id. at 19-20 (noting advertisements cost money and campaign expenditure cap would
have reduced campaign spending in number of 1974 congressional races).
71. Id. at44.
72. Id. ("[T]he constitutionality of [the expenditure limitation] turns on whether the governmental
interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First
Amendment rights of political expression." (emphasis added)).
73. Id. at 58.
74. Id. at 45.
75. Id.at 44.
76. Id.at 47 ("The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments
from the candidate.").
77. See id. at 45 ("[S]o long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as
they want to promote the candidate and his views.").
78. Id.at 57 (noting primary goal appeared to be reducing "skyrocketing" cost of campaigns and
stating was not legitimate aim under First Amendment).
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After Buckley, the Soft Money and Issue Ad Loopholes Further
UnderminedFECA's Effectiveness

In the years following the Buckley decision, those seeking to buy
influence with elected officials increasingly exploited two loopholes in

the law. 79 The soft money loophole evolved from FECA itself and
administrative interpretations of the law. 80 The issue ad loophole derived
from the Buckley Court's narrow construction of FECA's independent
expenditure restrictions 81 and the resulting express advocacy
requirement.82
1.

The Soft Money Loophole EnabledLarge Donors to Circumvent
FECA's ContributionLimits

The soft money loophole arose out of the definition of "contribution"
in FECA.83 Because the U.S. Constitution gave Congress the authority to
regulate federal elections, but not state elections,84 FECA specifically
defined contributions to include only those donations intended to
influence federal elections.85 Thus, the law permitted donations to the
political parties that exceeded FECA's contribution limits as long as the
contributions were intended to influence state elections.8 6 However,
some activities influence both state and federal elections, such as voter
registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns, and the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) determined that political parties could fund these
efforts partly with donations that were not subject to FECA's
contribution limits. 87 Commentators refer to these donations as
79. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 122-29 (2003).
80. See id. at 122-25.
81. Although the Court ultimately struck down FECA's limit on independent expenditures, even
after narrowly construing the statute, the Court did uphold the law's disclosure requirement for
independent expenditures insofar as it applied to express advocacy. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
82. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 126-28.
83. The core definition of "contribution" includes "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federaloffice." 2 U.S.C. § 431 (8)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (emphasis added).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.").
85. 2 U.S.C. § 43 l(8)(A)(i); see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 123.
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contributions of "soft money." 88 The soft money loophole thus enabled
donors to give huge contributions to the national parties to ostensibly
influence 89state races-but which also had a major impact on federal
elections.
2.

The Issue Ad Loophole Also Led to Evasion of FECA 's
ContributionLimits

The issue ad loophole resulted from the Buckley Court's narrow
construction of FECA's independent expenditure restrictions, which
regulated people's spending "relative to" candidates. 90 In construing the
statute to avoid vagueness, the Court determined that the restrictions
applied only to spending that "expressly advocated" the election or
91
defeat of a candidate through use of words like "Vote for John Smith."
However, a side effect of this express advocacy requirement was that
advertisements that were clearly designed to influence federal elections
fell outside of FECA's restrictions if they did not use "magic words" like
"vote for" or "vote against., 92 Such issue ads commonly appeared on
television shortly before an election and were highly critical of a
candidate's positions on issues. 93 Issue ads, combined with the soft
94
money loophole, significantly undermined FECA's regulatory regime.
In sum, FECA was a partially effective congressional attempt to
toughen campaign finance restrictions. In Buckley, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the law's contribution limits were constitutional because
they were closely drawn to meet the important governmental interests of
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. The law's
expenditure limits, however, imposed too great a burden on First
Amendment rights to survive exacting scrutiny, even if only applied to

88. See id. The phrase "soft money" has since been extended to refer to other types of unlimited
contributions. For example, Washington State law limits contributions to state political parties, but
contains a limited exception for certain donations, which have also been called soft money because
they are not subject to the normal contribution limit. See infra Part II.A.
89. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 125-26.
90. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1976) (construing independent expenditure limit);
id. at 80 (construing independent expenditure reporting and disclosure requirements).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 45.
93. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127.
94. See id. at 129-30 (quoting Senator Susan Collins with approval: "The twin loopholes of soft
money and bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us
with little more than a pile of legal rubble.").
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express advocacy. After the Buckley decision, the exploitation of
loopholes in the law further undermined FECA.
II.

THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT OUTLAWED
LIMITATIONS ON ISSUE AD SPENDING BY PARTIES
Washington State citizens have sought to regulate state political
96

campaign activity, 95 but court decisions have undermined their efforts.
Specifically, the people of Washington enacted the Fair Campaign
Practices Act (FCPA), which includes a provision that prevents political
parties from using large organizational contributions to promote
individual candidates.97 When the Washington State Republican Party
spent such contributions on an issue ad to promote its candidate for
governor, the state's Public Disclosure Commission (PDC), an oversight
and enforcement agency, brought an action against the Party for
violating FCPA. 98 In the resulting litigation, the Washington State
Supreme Court determined that the provision was unconstitutional as
applied against the Party.99 The court reasoned that the Buckley decision
foreclosed any limit on issue ad spending. 100 In response to this decision,
the PDC amended an administrative rule to allow the parties to spend
unlimited contributions on issue advertisements.10 1

95. Initiative 276, passed in 1972, set up disclosure requirements for lobbying and campaign
activity.
See
Initiatives
to the
People:
1914
through
2003,
available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statistics initiatives.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2005)
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17 (2004)). In 1992, voters approved Initiative 134,
the Fair Campaign Practices Act, which imposed a variety of campaign contribution limits. See
Initiatives
to
the
Legislature:
1914
through
2002,
at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statistics initleg-ar.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2005)
(codified in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.04 and 42.17 (2004)).
96. See Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 141 Wash. 2d
245, 282, 4 P.3d 808, 828 (2000) (holding provision of state campaign finance law violated First
Amendment as applied).
97. See Fair Campaign Practices Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(6), (14) (2002).
98. See Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wash. 2d at 252,4 P.3d at 813.
99. See id. at 282, 4 P.3d at 828.
100. Seeid. at 263,4 P.3dat 819.
101. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-17-060(3) (2003) (amended by PDC in response to Wash.
State Republican Party, 141 Wash. 2d 245, 4 P.3d 808).
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FCPA GuardsAgainst Corruption Through a Series of Interrelated
ContributionLimits

In addition to limiting what can be contributed to candidates'
campaigns directly, 10 2 FCPA contains provisions designed to prevent
circumvention of these limits through the state's political parties.' 0 3 One
such provision limits how much nonparty organizations (corporations,
labor unions, and unincorporated political associations) can contribute to
state political parties. 104 However, this limitation is subject to an
exception that allows contributions in excess of the cap as long as the
parties spend these excess funds on specific activities that do not
promote individual candidates. 0 5 This exception is known as the "soft
money" exception,' 0 6 and administrative rules require the state political
parties to set7 up separate bank accounts for these exempt
0
contributions.
B.

The Washington State Republican Party Court Held that
Washington's Limits on Issue Advertising Violate the First
Amendment

Despite FCPA's limitation on the use of political parties' soft money,
the Washington State Republican Party used $150,000 from its exempt
account for the final three weeks of the 1996 gubernatorial election to

102. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(1) ("No person .. may make contributions to a
candidate for a state legislative office that in the aggregate exceed five hundred dollars or to a
candidate for a [statewide] office that in the aggregate exceed one thousand dollars for each election
in which the candidate is on the ballot ....
").These contribution caps are adjusted to account for
inflation and in 2004 were $675 and $1,350 respectively. See 2004 State Contribution Limits, at
http://www.pdc.wa.gov/filerassistance (last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
103. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.17.640(3), 42.17.640(6), 42.17.670 (limiting ability of
donors to earmark contributions to political parties to benefit individual candidates).
104. See id. § 42.17.640(6). The $2,500 per year statutory limit is adjusted for inflation; in 2004
the
statutory
limit
was
$3,400.
See 2004
State
Contribution
Limits,
at
http://www.pdc.wa.gov/filerassistance (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
105. See WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.640(14). The exception applies to contributions "for voter
registration, for absentee ballot information, for precinct caucuses, for get-out-the-vote campaigns,
for precinct judges or inspectors, for sample ballots, or for ballot counting, all without promotion of
or political advertising for individual candidates." Id.
106. Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 141 Wash. 2d 245,
251, 4 P.3d 808, 812 (2000). The phrase "soft money" in this context is slightly different than in the
federal context because the underlying statutory provisions are different. However, at both the state
and federal level, the term refers to unlimited contributions to political parties. See supra Part I.D. 1.
107. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-17-060(2) (2003).
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purchase a television advertisement critical of Democratic candidate
Gary Locke.10 8 The advertisement disparaged Locke's record on crime
and urged viewers to call Locke to express their opinions.' 0 9 The PDC
believed that the Republican Party had violated FCPA because its
expenditure on the advertisement did not fall within any of the
statutorily permissible uses of soft money. 10 Accordingly, the PDC
brought an enforcement action against the Republican Party; the Party
countered that such enforcement would violate its First Amendment
rights."'
In Washington State Republican Party, the Washington State
Supreme Court struck down FCPA's limitation on soft money
expenditures after determining that the ad in question was an issue ad." 2
In its decision, the court focused entirely on the issue-oriented nature of
3 The court did
the political speech in the ad. 11
not scrutinize whether the4
statutory limitation was a contribution limit or an expenditure limit,1
and it applied neither "closely drawn" nor "exacting" scrutiny to the
law. 115 Instead, the court provided an unqualified holding that Buckley
prevented any government restriction on issue ads. 16 The court justified
its position by reasoning that issue ads pose no threat of corruption, even17
if large corporations or other organizational donors fund the ads.
While acknowledging that the Party intended the ad to persuade voters
and "was partisan, negative in tone, and appeared prior to the
election,"'" 8 the court nevertheless concluded that the First Amendment
protected the ad from government regulation." 9
108. See Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wash. 2d at 251-52, 4 P.3d at 812-13.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 252,4 P.3d at 813.
111. Id.

112. See id. at 263, 4 P.3d at 819 ("A conclusion that the advertisement is issue advocacy largely
resolves this case.").
113. See id.
114. See id. at 274,4 P.3d at 824.
115. See id. at 283, 4 P.3d at 829. Without applying either the closely drawn test for contribution
limits or the exacting scrutiny test for expenditure limits, the court concluded "the
unconstitutionality in the statute results both from limitations on contributions for issue-oriented
political speech and the prohibition on exempt expenditures for such speech." Id.
116. Id. at 282-83, 4 P.3d at 828-29.
117. See id. at 275,4 P.3d at 824.
118. Id. at 273,4 P.3d at 823.
119. Id. The court did not examine how the Free Speech Clause of the state constitution would
apply to the soft money limitation, and such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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In Response to Washington State Republican Party, the PDC
Amended Its Rules to Allow Partiesto Use Soft Money on Issue
Ads

The FCPA created the PDC to enforce the statute's requirements,
giving the PDC authority to adopt administrative rules and carry out the
purposes of the law. 120 After the Washington State Republican Party
ruling, the PDC issued an interpretation concluding that a political party
could use its soft money for issue advocacy. 12 1 The PDC incorporated
this result into an administrative 122
rule defining activities that are exempt
from FCPA's contribution limits.
In sum, FCPA limited contributions by nonparty organizations to state
political parties, unless the parties spent the contributions on certain
activities that did not promote individual candidates. The Washington
State Supreme Court, however, invalidated this limitation to the extent
that it prevented contributions from funding issue ads. The court based
its decision on the conclusion that the Buckley decision prevented any
government restrictions on issue ad spending. Because of this ruling, the
PDC currently permits the state's political parties to use their soft money
to fund issue advertising.
III.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT UPHELD KEY PROVISIONS OF
BCRA IN MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION

Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 to
close loopholes in FECA's regulatory regime. 23 FECA had proven
inadequate to curb the corrupting influence of large campaign
Interestingly, however, the framers of the Washington State Constitution were very concerned with
the risk that corporations and special interest groups would exert an undue influence over the
legislature, and this concern similarly underlies FCPA. See WASH. CONST. art. II § 28 (restricting
the legislature's ability to pass special legislation); WASH. CONST. art. XII (restricting corporate
powers). WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.620 (2002) (stating that the intent of the statute is "[t]o Ensure
that individuals and interest groups have fair and equal opportunity to influence elective and
governmental processes" and "[t]o Reduce the influence of large organizational contributors").
120. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.370(1).
121. See PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COMMISSION, INTERPRETATION NO. 00-04, USE OF SOFT MONEY

FOR ISSUE ADVOCACY (2000), at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/guide/interpretations/pdf/005.pdf (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005).
122. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-17-060(3) (2003).
123. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. BCRA is also
known as the McCain-Feingold Law after its primary Senate sponsors.
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contributions on the United States' political system. 124 Opponents of
BCRA immediately challenged its constitutionality, 125 and the resulting
litigation ended with the most comprehensive and important campaign
finance decision since Buckley. 126 A majority of the McConnell Court
firmly favored the law's key restrictions.127 The Court first clarified the
distinction between contribution limits and expenditure limits; it then
classified restrictions on soft money spending as a type of contribution
limitation subject to closely drawn scrutiny. 128 Next, the Court
concluded that the law's restrictions were not unconstitutionally
vague. 129 Finally, it analyzed the contribution limits using closely
drawn
130
scrutiny and the expenditure limits using exacting scrutiny.
A.

The McConnell Decision Clarified the Distinction Between
ContributionLimits and Expenditure Limits

BCRA sought to close the soft money loophole through two key
provisions, 13 1 both of which the McConnell Court classified as
contribution limits rather than expenditure limits. 132 The first provision
bans the national political parties from receiving or spending soft money
contributions.1 33 The second provision, in an effort to prevent evasion of

124. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003) (stating Congress passed
BCRA to address concerns about issue advertising and soft money loophole, which had undermined
FECA's regulatory regime).
125. McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 206 (D.D.C. 2003).
126. See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n and the Transformation of
Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 147 (2004) (noting decision was "no doubt, the
single greatest legal victory for campaign finance regulation since the modem era of campaign
finance law was ushered in three decades ago").
127. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224.
128. See id. at 141.
129. See id. at 170 n.64 (determining restrictions on public communications were not vague); id.
at 194 (determining restrictions on electioneering communication were not vague).
130. See id. at 141 (determining BCRA's soft money restrictions were contribution limits subject
to closely drawn scrutiny); id. at 204-05 (determining BCRA's limitations on expenditures for
electioneering communications were subject to exacting scrutiny).
131. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b, 441i (Supp. 112002). This loophole permitted unlimited contributions
to political parties, despite FECA's $20,000 party contribution limit, on the theory that they were
intended to influence state elections and thus fell outside the statutory definition of contribution. See
supra Part I.D. 1.
132. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 141.
133. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (Supp. II 2002) ("A national committee of a political
party... may not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of
funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations,
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this national party ban, 134 prohibits state political parties from spending
soft money on "federal election activities."'' 35 Such activities include any
"public communication"' 36 that refers to a federal candidate and
"promote[s] or support[s] a candidate for that office, or attack[s] or
oppose[s] a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the
communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a
candidate)."13' 7
Even though these loophole-closing provisions restrict the
expenditure of soft money by state and national parties, the Court
classified them as contribution limits and applied closely drawn scrutiny
to determine their constitutionality. 138 The Court reasoned that these
restrictions limited contributions by limiting expenditures, 139 and
therefore they imposed no greater burden on First Amendment rights
than direct contribution limits. 140 Consequently, the Court viewed the
ban on national party receipt or expenditure of soft money as a type of
contribution limitation,' 4 ' and therefore it received closely drawn
scrutiny.142 The Court applied the same level of scrutiny to BCRA's
prohibition on certain expenditures by state political parties because the
prohibition was aimed at limiting contributions and merely used
expenditure caps as a tool to achieve that end. 143 The Court distinguished
prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act." (emphasis added)).
134. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161.
135. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1) (Supp. II 2002) ("[A]n amount that is expended or disbursed for
Federal election activity by a State, district, or local committee of a political party ... shall be made
from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.").
136. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(22) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (including any "communication by means of
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication").
137. Id. § 431 (20)(A)(iii). This proscription includes the subset of issue ads that are most likely to
be corrupting: those that are candidate-specific. See id.
138. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 141.
139. See id. at 138 ("[F]or purposes of determining the level of scrutiny, it is irrelevant that
Congress chose in [the soft money bans] to regulate contributions on the demand rather than the
supply side.").
140. See id. at 138-39 ("The relevant inquiry is whether the mechanism adopted to implement the
contribution limit, or to prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a direct
restriction on the contribution itself would not. That is not the case here.").
141. The Court clearly stated that laws that prevent evasion of contribution limits are themselves
a type of contribution limit. See id. at 144.
142. See id. at 141; cf.Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 443 (2001) (noting importance of "functional"
rather than "formal" definition of contribution limit); id. at 456 (holding party's contributions to
candidate could be limited and coordinated expenditures could be counted as contributions).
143. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 167. The Court essentially viewed this expenditure restriction as
a type of contribution limit-a contribution limit that was contingent upon how the contributions
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BCRA's limits on soft money expenditures from the expenditure limits
it had struck down in the Buckley opinion by emphasizing that BCRA's
limits did not cap the overall amount that a political actor could spend to
express political views. 144 Under BCRA, political parties can spend
do so by aggregating donations
unlimited amounts, as long as they
45
limit.'
contribution
the
than
smaller
The McConnell Court classified another provision of BCRA, which
further curtailed the issue ad loophole by 146prohibiting certain kinds of
47
limit.'
corporate and labor union issue advocacy, as an expenditure
Specifically, the provision outlawed corporate and labor union general
treasury money from funding "electioneering communications,"'' 48 a
newly coined term meant to replace the narrowly construed "relative to"
language. 49 The Court determined that the provision called for exacting
scrutiny because the issue ad ban would necessarily reduce the quantity
of campaign speech in the political marketplace, like the limits struck
down in Buckley.150

B.

BCRA 's Restrictions Were Not UnconstitutionallyVague

The McConnell Court dismissed vagueness challenges to BCRA's
restrictions on issue advocacy after concluding that the restrictions were
were spent.
144. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 139.
145. See id.; cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1976) ("The overall effect of the Act's
contribution ceilings is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a
greater number of persons ...").
146. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (Supp. II 2002) (prohibiting contributions and expenditures by
corporations and labor unions, including electioneering communications).
147. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203-04.
148. "Electioneering communication" includes any "broadcast, cable or satellite communication
which
(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
(II) is made within(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the
candidate; or
(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political
party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and
in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than
(1II)
President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate."
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2004).
149. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189.
150. See id. at 204-05; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58 (striking down limits on the overall
amount that could be spent by campaigns, independent individuals, or groups to express political
ideas).
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sufficiently clear to give fair warning as to what conduct they
prohibited. 15' The Court emphasized that its earlier express advocacy
requirement was a product of statutory construction to avoid
unconstitutional vagueness, rather than a First Amendment
requirement. 52 Thus, the narrow construction that the Buckley Court
gave to FECA's campaign regulations is specific to that statutory
language and does not extend to statutes that are not vague. 53 The Court
then held that BCRA's restriction on state party-funded "public
communications" that "promote," "support," "attack," or "oppose"
federal candidates is not unconstitutionally vague because a person of
ordinary intelligence would understand what the statute prohibits. 154 The
Court then concluded that BCRA's definition of "electioneering
communication"'' 55 was also sufficiently specific to meet the
Constitution's requirement of definiteness because its provisions were
56
easily understood and objectively determinable. 1
C.

The McConnell Decision Upheld Restrictionson Soft Money
Spending and Issue Ads

The Court held that BCRA's provisions restricting the national and
state political parties from receiving or spending soft money did not
violate the First Amendment because they were closely drawn to match
a sufficiently important government interest. 157 Like the contribution
limits upheld in Buckley, BCRA's limitations furthered the "sufficiently
important" interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption.1 58 The national party ban furthered this interest by curtailing
evasion of the limit on contributions to parties. 59 Limiting contributions

151. See McConnell,540 U.S. at 170 n.64.

152. Id. at 190 ("[T]he express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation,
not a first principle of constitutional law.").
153. Id. at 191-92.
154. See id. at 170 n.64 (stating "words 'promote,' 'oppose,' 'attack,' and 'support' clearly set
forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the
provision," and noting any doubts could be resolved through advisory opinions).
155. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (West
Supp.2004).

156. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194 ("[The new] definition of 'electioneering communication' raises
none of the vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley.").
157. See id. at 156 (upholding national party ban); id. at 173 (upholding state party ban).
158. See id.at143.
159. See 2

U.S.C.

§§441a(a)(l)(B), 441i(a)

(Supp. II

2002). Prior to BCRA,

donors
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to the parties was in turn legitimate because it minimized circumvention
of the direct limits on campaign contributions.16 0 The state party ban
prevented large donors from evading the limits of the national party ban
by giving money directly to state parties to be spent on activities that
would influence federal elections.' 61 The Court determined that the
provisions were also closely drawn because they focus on a subset of
donations most likely to be corrupting. 162
Using exacting scrutiny analysis, the Court next upheld BCRA's ban
1 63
on certain issue ad expenditures by corporations and labor unions.
Because special characteristics of the corporate form provided a
compelling justification for the limit, the Court determined that this
independent expenditure limit was dissimilar to the one struck down in
Buckley.'64 The restriction was also narrowly tailored in that it permitted
"separate segregated funds" financed by voluntary union member or
65
corporate shareholder donations. 1
In sum, the McConnell Court affirmed Congress's power to limit
contributions to political parties, even if Congress does so by regulating
expenditures, as long as the regulations are closely drawn to match a
sufficiently important government interest.1 66 BCRA's ban on the receipt
or expenditure of soft money by the national political parties satisfies
this standard because it is closely drawn to prevent the circumvention of
accomplished such evasion by donating money to the national parties in excess of the statutory
ceiling. The donations ostensibly influenced state elections, but they in fact benefited federal
candidates. See supra Parts I.D.1-.2; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-26 (discussing evolution
of soft money).
160. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144 (noting contributions to candidate's party can benefit that
candidate, thus creating corrupting effect); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976)
(upholding FECA's total contribution limit of $25,000, including $20,000 limit on contributions to
national parties); Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263.
161. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161-62.
162. See, e.g., id. at 169 (discussing how certain federal election activities are limited to 120 days
before general election); see also 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(B) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (permitting soft
money to be used for campaign activity solely referring to state candidates).
163. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (examining whether law was justified by compelling
government interest).
164. See id. "We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at 'the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas."' Id.
(citing Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
165. See id. at 203 (describing corporate and labor union separate segregated funds as
constitutionally sufficient).
166. See id. at 141.
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anti-corruption measures. 16 BCRA's prohibition of soft money
expenditures by state and local parties on federal election activities,
including public communications that promote, support, attack, or
oppose federal candidates, is also constitutional. 168 Lastly, BCRA's bar
on corporate and union expenditures for electioneering communications
is not unconstitutionally vague and is supported by a compelling
69
government interest.

IV. AFTER MCCONNELL, THE HOLDING OF WASHINGTON
STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY IS NO LONGER VIABLE
By upholding the key provisions of BCRA, the McConnell Court
demonstrated that Washington State's law preventing political parties
from spending their soft money on issue ads is also constitutional. By
clarifying that the government can regulate issue ads consistently with
the First Amendment,' 7" the McConnell decision showed that the central
basis for the Washington State Republican Party decision was
erroneous.' 71 When next confronted by this issue, Washington courts
should apply the basic approach provided by the Buckley Court and
classify Washington's limitation on the expenditure of soft money as a
contribution limit subject to closely drawn scrutiny. 172 The statutory
limitation gives fair warning of what conduct it prohibits, and therefore
the statute is not vague. 173 Washington's statute should survive a closely
drawn scrutiny analysis because it furthers the same sufficiently
important government interests as the analogous provisions upheld in
174
McConnell, while at the same time it is more closely drawn.

167. See id. at 156.
168. See id. at 173 (upholding 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b) (Supp. II 2002) as "closely drawn to match the
important governmental interests of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption").
169. See id. at 209.
170. See id. at 192.
171. See Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comrnm'n, 141 Wash. 2d
245, 263, 4 P.3d 808, 819 (2000).
172. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 138-39 (indicating regulating contributions by limiting
expenditures is form of contribution limit).
173. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(14) (2002); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64 (upholding
analogous provisions in BCRA against vagueness challenge).
174. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161 (upholding national party soft money ban).
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The Washington State Supreme CourtErroneously Focusedon
Absolute Protectionfor Issue Ads

A.

In Washington State Republican Party, the Washington State
Supreme Court's erroneously held that the First Amendment bars any
restrictions on issue ads. 175 The U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected
this interpretation in McConnell.176 The McConnell Court explained that
the Buckley Court introduced the express advocacy requirement to avoid
finding unconstitutional vagueness in the particular statute at issue, not
to preclude regulation of issue ads for all time. 177 As a result, the
McConnell Court approved BCRA's spending limitations on issue
ads. 178 Because the Washington State Supreme Court misconstrued
concerns about vagueness as the adoption of an unqualified rule
prohibiting regulation of issue advocacy, 179 the Court primarily focused
on the nature of the political speech in the ad. 180 The Washington State
Republican Party court erred because it failed to apply the Buckley
approach to analyze the legality of the Washington State statute.'8 1 The
court should have assessed whether the law's restrictions were more like
the contribution limits upheld in Buckley under closely drawn scrutiny,
or more like the expenditure limits that the82Buckley Court struck down as
unconstitutional under exacting scrutiny.
B.

Washington's Soft Money RestrictionIs a Contribution Limit
Subject to Buckley's Closely Drawn Scrutiny Test

The Washington State Supreme Court should have classified FCPA's
limitation on contributions to the state's political parties as a
contribution limit and applied the closely drawn scrutiny test to
175. See Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wash. 2d at 276, 4 P.3d at 825.
176. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 191-92.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 173 (approving limits on public communications); id. at 209 (approving limits on

electioneering communication).
179. See Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wash. 2d at 263-64, 4 P.3d at 819 (concluding
Buckley held "issue advocacy is beyond the reach of government regulation").
180. See id. at 263-74, 4 P.3d at 819-24.
181. See id. at 283, 4 P.3d at 829. Without applying either the closely drawn test for contribution

limits or the exacting scrutiny test for expenditure limits, the court concluded, "the
unconstitutionality in the statute results both from limitations on contributions for issue-oriented
political speech and the prohibition on exempt expenditures for such speech." Id.
182. Cf McConnell, 540 U.S. at 138-41 (determining first the appropriate level of scrutiny for
BCRA's soft money provisions).
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determine its constitutionality. 1 83 Although the law's general party
contribution limit contains an exception for some donations,184 it does
not permit parties to spend the resulting soft money on issue ads. 185 This
prohibition is analogous to the national and state soft money bans in
BCRA, which limit contributions indirectly by placing limits on
expenditures. 86 For example, BCRA limits soft money contributions to
state political parties by subjecting the funds that political parties spend
on federal election activities, including issue ads, to the $25,000 party
contribution limit. 87 Viewing spending limits as a type of contribution
limit, the McConnell Court applied closely drawn scrutiny. 188 In doing
so, the Court stated that "for purposes of determining the level of
scrutiny, it is irrelevant that Congress chose... to regulate contributions
on the demand rather than the supply side."' 89 Accordingly, Washington
State courts should conclude that FCPA's analogous limits on the
expenditure of soft money are also a type of contribution limit and
should apply the closely drawn standard to determine their
constitutionality.
Additionally, courts should analyze FCPA's soft money spending
limit with closely drawn scrutiny because the limit does not place an
overall cap on party expenditures. 190 Fundamentally, a lower standard of
scrutiny is appropriate for contribution limits because they do not
impose an overall cap on what a political actor can spend to express
political ideas.' 9' As the Buckley Court noted, limiting the size of
campaign contributions does not limit how much a campaign can spend;

183. See id. at 141 (emphasizing that, like candidate contribution limits, political party
contribution limits are subject to closely drawn scrutiny rather than more exacting scrutiny used for
expenditure limitations).
184. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(14) (2004).
185. See id. § 42.17.640(6), (14) (listing permissible uses for soft money, without mentioning
issue advocacy, and specifically barring use of soft money to promote or advertise for individual
candidates).
186. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 138-39; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)-(b) (Supp. 11 2002)
(prohibiting expenditures in excess of prescribed caps).
187. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(B), 441i(b).
188. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 141.
189. Id. at 138 (citation omitted).
190. See Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 141 Wash. 2d
245, 274, 4 P.3d 808, 824 (2000) (acknowledging party could spend unlimited amount of
aggregated contributions).
191. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
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192
it only requires campaigns to raise money from more sources.
Therefore, courts should apply closely drawn scrutiny, rather than
exacting scrutiny, to Washington's campaign restriction because it does
not limit the overall amount that political parties can spend.' 93 Indeed,
an unlimited number of $3,400 contributions
the parties could aggregate
94
spending.
for political

C.

Washington State's Limitation on the Use of Soft Money Is Not
Unconstitutionally Vague

Like the measures approved in McConnell, Washington State's
mechanism for prohibiting the state political parties from using their soft
money to fund issue advertising is sufficiently specific to avoid the
vagueness concerns that troubled the Court in Buckley. Like BCRA's
ban on "electioneering communications" by corporations and labor
unions, Washington State's regulatory scheme is clear and easy to
understand.' 9 The law expressly prohibits any use of soft money ' to
96
"promote" or "politically advertise for individual candidates."'
Additionally, FCPA spells out a list of specific activities that soft money
97
may be used for, and this list does not include broadcast advertising.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court held that BCRA gave clear notice to labor
unions and corporations that they could no longer spend their general
treasury funds on issue ads, 198 Washington State's law also gives clear
notice that it prohibits the political parties from spending soft money on

192. Seeid. at 21-22.
193. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(6), (14) (2002).
194. Of course, if the parties coordinate their spending with a candidate's campaign, then a
different provision of the law would limit the expenditure based on the number of registered voters
in the jurisdiction the candidate is seeking to represent. See id. § 42.17.640(3). The U.S. Supreme
Court made clear in Colorado II, however, that closely drawn scrutiny should also apply to this type

of "expenditure limit" because coordinated expenditure limits are really limits on what parties can
contribute to their candidates and do not limit the overall amount that campaigns can spend.
Colorado II, 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001).
195. Cf McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 194 (2003) (approving electioneering
communications provisions of FECA against vagueness challenge because they were "easily
understood and objectively determinable.").
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(14).
197. Id.
198. More precisely, the Court upheld a ban on corporate or labor union use of general treasury
funds for the subset of issue ads that fit within the definition of electioneering communication. See
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.

214
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such ads. 199
Even if a court deemed the language of the Washington State statute
to be less clear than the electioneering communications provision in
BCRA, another BCRA provision that the McConnell Court upheld
against a vagueness challenge closely parallels FCPA's language.2 °0
Specifically, BCRA prohibits state political parties from spending soft
money contributions on federal election activities.20 1 One such activity is
"public communication" that "promotes," "supports," "attacks," or
"opposes" a candidate for federal office. 20 2 The statute does not define
"promote," "support," "attack," or "oppose," yet the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld this provision against a vagueness challenge, concluding that
such words give fair notice to political parties as to what kind of
spending is prohibited.20 3 The Washington statute contains analogous
language specifically barring political parties from using their soft
money for the "promotion of individual candidates. 20 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court's approval of nearly identical language shows that the
20 5
language of the Washington statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
Additionally, the PDC has the ability to issue rules to clarify any
uncertainty in the law's implementation,20 6 and this should allay any
remaining vagueness concerns.20 7

199. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(14).

200. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 43 1(20)(A)(iii) (2000 & Supp. II 2002), which reads
a public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office
(regardless of whether a candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or identified) and
that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that
office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a
candidate)
with WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(14)(a), which reads

[t]he following contributions are exempt
expenditure or contribution earmarked for
for precinct caucuses, for get-out-the-vote
sample ballots, or for ballot counting, all
individual candidates.

from the contribution limits of this section: An
voter registration, for absentee ballot information,
campaigns, for precinct judges or inspectors, for
without promotion of or political advertising for

201. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1) (Supp. 112002).
202. Id. § 431(20)(A)(iii).
203. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64.
204. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(14)(a).
205. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64 (approving prohibition on certain expenditure
"promot[ing] a candidate" against vagueness challenge).
206. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.370.
207. Cf McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64 (noting Federal Election Commission could provide
advisory opinions to clarify any uncertainty, sufficiently curing any remaining vagueness problem).
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FCPA Should Survive Closely Drawn Scrutiny

Washington State's limitation on the state political parties is
constitutional under the closely drawn test. First, the government has a
sufficiently important interest in preventing corruption at the state
level. 2 °8 Second, as compared to the federal provisions upheld in
McConnell,20 9 the Washington State law is more closely drawn to
achieve the state's interest. 210 Therefore, FCPA satisfies both prongs of
Buckley's

closely

drawn

analysis

and complies

with

the

First

Amendment's requirements.2 1
1.

FCPA Attempts to Prevent Corruptionand the Appearance of
Corruption,a Sufficiently ImportantInterest
FCPA,

like

the

federal

provisions

upheld

in

Buckley

and

McConnell,"2 furthers the sufficiently important government interest of
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. Its restrictions
on political parties serve these ends by preventing circumvention of
limits on contributions given directly to candidates. 1 3 The McConnell

Court unreservedly confirmed that anti-circumvention provisions served
a government interest that is sufficiently important to withstand a First
Amendment challenge.2

14

While the limits upheld in McConnell applied

at the federal rather than the state level, Washington State's interest in
preventing corruption is no less important than the federal government's
interest in the same goal.2 15

208. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000).
209. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161 (upholding national party soft money ban); id. at 173
(upholding state party soft money ban).
210. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(6), (14) (2004).
211. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136 (laying out two-pronged closely drawn scrutiny test).
212. See id. at 143 ("Our cases have made clear that the prevention of corruption or its
appearance constitutes a sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution limits.");
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976).
213. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(1) (2004); cf McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144 (discussing
how federal limit on contributions to national political parties serves to prevent circumvention of
direct contribution limits).
214. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144.
215. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (noting states' legitimate
interest in preventing corruption and appearance of corruption).
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2.

FCPA's ContributionRestriction on PoliticalPartiesIs Closely
Drawn to Match this Sufficiently Important Interest

Washington State's restriction on contributions to political parties is
actually more closely drawn than the analogous federal provisions
approved by the McConnell Court. FCPA sweeps less broadly by
permitting individuals to give unlimited amounts to the state political
parties, whereas the federal regime caps donations to the national
political parties at $25,000.216 Additionally, corporations and labor
unions can donate up to $3,400 in Washington State, but under FECA
they are barred from contributing or spending any amount in connection
with any federal election. 217 Moreover, under Washington State law,
these organizations can give as much as they wish beyond the $3,400
limit, as long as the funds are spent on specific activities that do not
promote individual candidates. 2 18 This exception complies with the law's
anti-corruption rationale because activities that do not benefit individual
office holders pose less risk of corruption. 19 Collectively, these
considerations show that Washington State's campaign finance law
imposes more modest restrictions on contributions to state political
parties than would be constitutionally permissible under the McConnell
decision.
V.

CONCLUSION

Recognizing the corrupting influence large organizational campaign
contributions may have on policy makers, the people of Washington
State have attempted to restrict the size of campaign contributions. In
addition to limiting direct donations to candidates' campaigns,
Washington State law seeks to avoid circumvention of these limits by
capping contributions to political parties. In Washington State
Republican Party, the Washington State Supreme Court invalidated this
cap on First Amendment grounds to the extent that the law limited issue
ad spending. In response to this decision, Washington State's Public
216. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(B) (Supp. 112002) (permitting "no person" to give in excess
of contribution limit), with WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(6) (permitting "no person other than an
individual" to give in excess of contribution limit).
217. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (Supp. II 2002). This is an exception to the Buckley decision's general
rule that expenditures cannot be limited. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205.
218. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.640(14)(a).
219. Cf Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 141 Wash. 2d
245,274, 4 P.3d 808, 824 (2000) (discussing the narrow tailoring of RCW 42.17.640(14)).
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Disclosure Commission modified its rules to permit parties to spend
their soft money on issue ads. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent
McConnell decision, however, held that the First Amendment does not
bar limitations on issue ad spending. In light of this decision, the Public
Disclosure Commission should issue new administrative rules clarifying
that the expenditure of soft money by state political parties on issue ads
violates Washington State law and will no longer be permitted.

